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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH*

SEP2S1986
THE STATE OF UTAHf

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING
RU L E 3 5

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

Cl3rk

supreme Court, Utah

v.
Case No. 19588
FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

?ntf ity %

Appellant, through her appellate counsel, Ronald J,
Yengich and G. Fred Metos, hereby petitions this court for
re-hearing on the instant appeal. Said petition is based on the
grounds and

for the

reason that

this

court has

overlooked

and/or misapprehended certain points of law and fact.
Appellant has attached hereto, as required by Rule
35(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a brief which
details the basis for this petition.
Dated this

day of September, 1986.

RONALD J. YENGICH

G. FRED METOS

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on
this

day of September, 1986.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

CERTIFICATION OF C0UNSE1

Plaintiff/Respondentf
v.
Case No. 19588

FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER,

Prwtfy 7-

Defendant/Appellant.

If Ronald J. Yengich and G. Fred Metos, counsel for
appellant, Frances Berenice Schreuder, hereby certify, pursuant
to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the
petition filed in the instant case is being submitted in good
faith and not for purposes of delay.
In addition, there is no motivation for counsel to
delay these proceedings since appellant is and has been imprisoned at the Utah State Prison as a result of this conviction
during the pendency of this appeal.
Dated this

day of September, 1986.

RONALD J. YENGICH

G. FRED METOS
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on
this

day of September, 1986.
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IN T H E SUPREME COURT OF T H E STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF U T A H ,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

A P P E L L A N T ' S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

:

v#
Case Nc • 1 9 58 8 -•
FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER,

:

Defendar i t / A p p e l l a n t •

:
POINT

I

THIS C O U R T M I S A P P R E H E N D E D BOTH T H E FACTS O F
THIS CASE A N D T H E L A W O N A C C O M P L I C E C O R R O B O R A T I O N , REQUIRING A R E H E A R I N G OF A P P E L LANT'S A P P E A L A N D A R E V E R S A L OF H E R C O N V I C TION.
This court m i s a p p r e h e n d e d

both the facts

and law in

addressing her point regarding the lack of c :>r r obor at ioi i of the
a c c o m p l i c e testimony,,
w h e t h e r the state

The point

had satisfied

that

appellant

the c o r r o b o r a t i o n
'

for the offense charged in i

-- r

First,

the trial

Befirens w a s an a c c o m p l i c e
2554)

court

for p u r p o s e s

was

requirement

>n.

The m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n of the facts rf
to two a r e a s .

raised

this case relates

had ruled

that

Richard

of c o r r o b o r a t i o n .

(R.

That fact w a s disregarded in this court' •• w itten opinion

on that issue.

S e c o n d , t h i s c o u t: t f o u r i d t h a t

: ; : i o ( ^ p • > * i1 e ' s

and Miles M a n n i n g ' s , testimony corroborated the accomplice
timony; however,

that

evidence

does

n^t relate

u

tilt

tescrime

c h a i: g e d i n t! i e 11 ;i f o r m a t i o n.
As p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , the trial court hell tha*
was an a c c o m p l i c e .

(R. 2554)

^ehrens

In reviewing Benre:;?.1 t ..- -timoriy

this court did
not
giveW. any
w eLibrary,
i g h tJ. Reuben
or Clark
acknowledgement
Digitized
by the Howard
Hunter Law
Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•-o t^i,t

finding by the trial court. Additionally, this court misstated
a critical portion of Behrens1 testimony, which related to his
knowledge or intent in introducing appellant to Miles Manning.
This court stated that Behrens introduced appellant to Miles
Manning, but he did

not know for what purpose.

On direct

examination, Behrens' stated,
0. Did she [the appellant] ever ask you if
you could hire or if you knew somebody who
would kill her father?
A. Yes.
Q.

And did you agree to do that?

A.

I said I would ask.

I didn't know—

Q. Did you arrange for her to meet with
someone then?
A.

Yes, I did.

0.

Who was that?

A. It was Miles Manning.
(Tr. 9-20-83, 970) [Emphasis added]
Behrens went on to state that he arranged at least "one or two"
meetings between appellant and Manning.

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 972)

Behrens also testified that he had been requested to
obtain a gun by both appellant and Marc Schreuder for the purpose
of killing Franklin Bradshaw.
tion, he testified

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 973)

that he traveled to Virginia

In addi-

on several

occasions to check out the possibility of purchasing a firearm
there.

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 974)

He further testified that these

contacts were in the fall of 1977, roughly one year before the
death of Franklin Bradshaw.

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 973)

However, in

the spring Digitized
of 1978,
Marc
Schreuder
requested
to obtain
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School,Behrens
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a gun for him on several occasions.

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 975)

Behrens testified that after Franklin Bradshaw was killed, Marc
Schreuder and appellant came to his home, where Behrens was
given the gun used in the homicide.

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 981) He

testified that he learned of the details of the homicide from
Marc.

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 981)
As was correctly noted in the majority opinion, the

test for whether a person is an accomplice is whether he could
also be charged with the offense.

If a person intentionally

aids another in the commission of an offense while acting with
the proper mental state he may be charged with that offense,
State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d

1161

(Utah 1980).

In this case

Behrens' actions, as described by himself, were that he made
interstate trips to find a firearm and also introduced appellant
to an alleged "hitman".

In doing this, Behrens testified that

he was aware of the unlawful purpose and the potential results
of his acts.

Such an awareness would certainly qualify as a

"knowing" or "intentional" act as defined in Utah Code Annotated,
§76-2-103 (1953

as

amended).

These

are

the mental

states

required for the offense with which the appellant was charged
(see generally, Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-202 (1953 as amended)).

Consequently, if Behrens* actions did connect appellant

to the homicide, such actions, combined with his mental state,
could have resulted in his being charged with the offense of
criminal homicide, this court should

re-hear and

reconsider

this appeal in light of Behrens1 status as an accomplice.
Furthermore,
court
misapprehended
law by
Digitized by the Howardthis
W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU. the
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

misconstruing the standard for review of accomplice testimony.
This court stated:
The corroboration need not go to all the
material facts as testified to by the
accomplice or be sufficient in itself to
support a conviction. It must only connect
the defendant with the commission of the
offense and be consistent with his guilt
and inconsistent with his innocence.
[Emphasis added] 39 UAR 46 at 48.
In State v. Christean, 533 P.2d 872 (Utah, 1975), this court
stated that the following was the definitive statement on the
standard by which courts and juries are to review the evidence
used to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice:
...the corroboration need not go to all the
material facts as testified by the accomplice, nor need it be sufficient in itself
to support a conviction; it may be slight
and entitled to little consideration. However, the corroborating evidence must
connect the defendant with the commission
of the offense [citation omitted]; and be
consistent with his guilt and inconsistent
with his innocence, [citation omitted].
The corroborating evidence must do more
than cast a grave suspicion on the defendant
and it must do all of these things without
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice.
State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P.2d 539,
at 541 (1953) .
As will be shown, the testimony of Manning and Gentile
does nothing more than cast suspicion on appellant.
Behrens was an accomplice.
the law

resulted

in

an

Richard

Thus, the court's misapplication of
erroneous

outcome

on

the

appeal.

With respect to the corroborative evidence given by
Vittorio Gentile, all

of his testimony

given regarding any

involvement by appellant in a homicide was the following:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. Was there some discussion at that lunch
about her father, Franklin Bradshaw?
A. There was only one discussion after we
finished lunch that was talked about.
Something she mentioned, something one
thing to put a contract on her father.
0* Mr. Gentile, do you recall how that
statement came about or how —
A. No, it was just out of the blue sky.
(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 819)
Obviously, this did not relate to the July 23rd, 1978,
homicide that Gentile's son, Marc Schreuder, was involved with.
Likewise, the testimony of Miles Manning relates, at best, only
to an uncharged and unrelated conspiracy.
out in

its majority

opinion, Manning

As this court points

claimed

to have been

approached by appellant in the fall of 1977 about a contract
to murder appellant's father. He was paid, but he testified that
he did not intend to commit this offense.
The testimony of these individuals must be considered
in the absence of Marc Schreuder's testimony, State v. Vigil,
supra.

If this court finds that Richard Behrens' actions and

mental state do not qualify him as an accomplice to the homicide,
of Franklin Bradshaw, that evidence must also fail to corroborate
Marc Schreuder's testimony.

The testimony regarding the 1977

attempts to hire Manning and have Behrens locate a firearm do
' not connect

appellant

nearly one year later.

to an

offense

committed

by

her son

At best, this evidence may raise an

inference as to motive, but such an inference does no more than
cast a suspicion on appellant. The testimony regarding disposal
of the murder weapon after the offense occurred may corroborate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a charge of Obstruction of Justice.1

But such evidence does

not corroborate any involvement on the part of appellant with
her father's homicide. Similarly, Gentile's testimony regarding
a "hit man" in the spring of 1978 is also unrelated to the
actual homicide in July of 1978.
As noted
rulings require

in appellant's brief, this court's prior

that

the

evidence

used

to

corroborate

an

accomplice's testimony must relate to the specific crime with
which the defendant
382, 284 P.2d

700

testimony relating

is charged.

In State v. Clark, 3 Ut.2d

(1959), this court held
to the use

that a witness'

of medications

to

induce an

abortion does not corroborate the accomplice's testimony relating
to a

charge

of

performing

an

abortion

by

instrument.

As

described in this court's opinion, the testimony of Behrens,
Manning

and Gentile described unrelated, uncharged, incidents,

not appellant's alleged inducement of Marc Schreuder to kill
Franklin Bradshaw.
In conclusion,

the

court

misapplied

the

required

standard of proof for corroboration of accomplice testimony.
To find sufficient corroboration in testimony that "only connects" appellant with the commission of an offense, in effect
allows evidence that raises only a "grave suspicion" to corroborate the

accomplice

testimony.

Under

this

court's

prior

rulings^ such evidence would not be sufficient to corroborate
1.

See

Utah

Code

Annotated,

§76-8-306

(1953

as

amended).

2. See generally, State v. Kerekes, supra; State v. Christean,
supra; StateDigitized
v. by
Vigil,
supra; and State v. Clark, supra.
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the accomplice's testimony.

Consequently, this court misappre-

hended a point of law by significantly lowering the standard of
proof on that issued

This court should grant the appellant a

rehearing on this issue, reverse the judgment of the district
court and enter an order to have appellant acquitted of the
charge of criminal homicide.
POINT II
THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE RELATING TO THE IMPROPER USE OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE BY THE STATE.
This court misapplied the facts of the instant case
in concluding that appellant was precluded

from raising the

issue in her appeal of the improper use of character evidence
by the state.

The grounds for this court's ruling were that

there was not a proper objection made by trial counsel at the
time that evidence was introduced and that the evidence was not
unfairly prejudicial.
Rule 103(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:

.

Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected,
and ...
Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating

3. Such retroactive judicial action lowering the quantity of
evidence needed to convict a defendant constitutes a denial of
appellant's Constitutional right to Due Process of Law. Bouie
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the
context•
Appellant concedes that trial counsel did not specifically state that he was objecting to the questionable evidence
on the basis of the improper use of character evidence. However,
this court needs to review the objection that was made and do
so in the context of the prior motion and previous objection
made by counsel. If that is done one can see that it is obvious
that the grounds for the objection are apparent from the context and the circumstances in which it was made.

Initially,

counsel made an objection based on the improper use of hearsay
testimony.

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 928)

Dr.

part of the Schreuder's family history

Moench then described
as related

by Marc.

When Dr. Moench began to describe a specific instance of conduct
relating to appellant's character (specifically a suicide attempt), another objection was made by counsel.

(Tr. 9-20-83,

p. 929) The relevant portion of that testimony was as follows:
0. [by Mr. Jones] And Dr. Moench, do you
recall what Marc Schreuder told you concerning his family and his history?
A.

Yes, I recall a great deal about it.

Q. What did he tell you about the background?
Mr. Rosen:
I will object.

I will object, Judge.

Now

The Court: I will let him — he is
talking only family history.
Nothing in
relation to the matter that Marc is charged
with before, Dr. Moench. We are not asking
that at this time.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Witness:
The Court:

Yesf sir.

You can answer.

The Witness: Marc told me about his
family background. He apparently lived in
New York. His parents were divorced when
he was approximately three years of age, as
I recall. He lived with his mother. He
had an older brother named Larry or Lawrence,
I guess, and a younger sister later on
named Lavinia.
He described his living with a stepfather
and the family. As I recall, the name
Frederick and the family moving to Europe,
spending time in Brussells and Holland and
Marc changing school, as I recall, for
different times while he was living in
Brussels or Belgium, excuse me, and then
returning. He told about the family problems between his mother and Frederick, his
brother and Frederick living in Europe
another year.
Repeated quarrels between
his mother and Frederick over the phone
during that time, of Frederick and Larry
returning and a great deal of strife going
on.
Frederick locking Marc's mother and Marc
out of the house. The mother locking
Frederick out of the house. Apparently a
great deal of turmoil during that time. He
told me about his brother being charged
with attempted murder of a roommate by
hitting him with a hammer, and, as I recall,
the brother was found not guilty by reason
of insanity and was due for a discharge
from another mental hospital at the time I
was interviewing Marc. Marc told about his
relationships to Gramps and his Grandma
and told about his mother, describing the
relationships she had with him.
He told about the disturbances in the
family. If things didn't go exactly as his
mother wanted, including threats of suicide
Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, please, I am
going to move to object and strike. I just
think it is going much further beyond what
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clarkadded]
Law School, BYU.
Your
Honor
allowed.
[Emphasis
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court: I will let him relate the
history he obtained as to the background of
the boy and his family relationships.
The Witness:
The Court:
sir.

May I continue?
Yes, you may continue on,

The Witness: He told about attempting
to persuade his mother not to commit suicide.
Apparently a very traumatic scene lasting
some half hour or so and told of his mother
taking an overdose of medication, and Marc,
as I recall, the age of 14 or 15 had to
summon the paramedics and have his mother
taken to the hospital. He told about his
mother locking Larry out of —
if Larry
didn't do everything she wanted, he told
about him being locked out of the apartment
and having no place to go except to spend
the night in the stairwell. He told of his
mother continuing to always be dissatisfied
and wanting to move to more elaborate
quarters. He described his relationship to
his mother after her time she spent with
the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist had
moved to Canada, and Marc had to virtually
take the place of a psychiatrist listening
to the mother's problems. He told about
not being permitted to have any other
friends and said that his mother was his
only friend. If he attempted to make
friends, she would always tell him this is
a bad boy you are spending time with and
not allowing him to have friends, so he
simply didn't have friends. He told me
about coming to Utah, as I recall, in 1977,
and the purpose of this was —
The Court: Just a moment, I think here
— do you know what the answer is, Mr.
Jones?
Mr. Jones:

I am not sure, Your Honor.

The Court: What I don't want, I think
you can tell us, Doctor, about the relationship with Marc and his mother, not what she
may have said to him or done or nothing in
relation to —
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr* Jones:

I understand*

The Court:

You understand*

Mr* Jones: Let me ask this question*
Was there anything else Marc would have
told you concerning his relationship with
his mother?
A: Yes, I think significantly if he didn't
do everything to please her, she would
threaten to lock him out, threaten to disown
him and repeatedly told him that they would
be disowned, that they would be thrown out
of their apartment, that they would wind up
in Harlem living in the gutter. That she
and Lavinia would starve if Marc didn't do
everything she said to* (Tr. 9-20-83, p.
928-931)
From this testimony, it can be seen that there were
two distinct objections made*
issue*

The first was to the hearsay

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 928) Dr. Moench was allowed to describe

Marc Schreuder's personal and family history as related to him
by Marc.

(Tr. 9-20-83, p. 930)

When Dr. Moench began to

describe appellant's character as related by Marc Schreuder a
second strenuous objection on different grounds was made.
9-20-83, p. 930)

(Tr.

It is unquestionable from the context that

counsel was objecting to references about appellant's character,
specifically to a reference to a suicide attempt.
Even if this court

is able to find

that such an

objection was insufficient the nature of the testimony itself
should have required its review under Rule 103(d) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

That Rule provides:

Nothing in ths rule precludes taking notice
of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the
attention of the court*
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The testimony

in

question

allowed

the

jury

hear

unsubstantiated and uncorroborated allegations that appellant
was suicidal, overbearing/ overprotective and suffering from
some sort of mental illness.

Dr. Moench was also allowed to

describe similar uncorroborated and unsubstantiated threats by
appellant relating to abandonment of her children and psychological , physical and emotional abuse of those children.

These

allegations came from a recognized medical expert in the field
of psychiatry.

The substance of this testimony had never been

raised by appellant.

Nor were these facts described by any of

the other witnesses, including Marc Schreuder.4

The obvious

effect of this testimony was to create an impression from a
medical expert that appellant was a person who is both psychologically deranged and a danger to herself, her children and
others.
There can be no question that allowing the jury to
hear evidence of this nature affected the substantial rights of
appellant.

The probative value of such evidence was minimal

when weighed against its prejudicial effect, Rule 403 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.5 in disregarding

both the objection

that was made and the substance of the testimony given by Dr.
Moench this court misapprehended the facts of this case. This
court should reconsider and rehear appellant's appeal, reverse

4. The impropriety in the use of this testimony was discussed
in Point III A of appellant's brief which is attached as "Appendix A".
5. See Point
III
B of
theLaw Brief
ofClark
Appellant,
attached as
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Library, J. Reuben
Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Appendix B w .

her conviction and order a new trial •
POINT III
THIS COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW RELATING TO
THE ISSUE OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A PATIENT'S
DECLARATIONS TO A PHYSICIAN MADE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF HAVING THE PHYSICIAN TESTIFY AT
TRIAL.
Appellant submits that the majority opinion misapprehended the law regarding Rule 803(4) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

That rule provides:
The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:..•
Statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception
or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

This rule

follows the

same federal

rule of evidence which

abolished the distinction between statements made to a physician
for treatment and statements made to a physician for purposes
of testifying at trial.

In allowing a physician to repeat the

patient's statements, this court

specifically

relied on the

holding in the case of United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77
(8th Cir., 1980) .
In Iron Shell, the Court of Appeals required that the
courts engage in a two tier analysis before such declarations
could be admissible. That analysis requires that the trial court
determine first, whether the declarant's motive was consistent
with the rule of evidence; and second, whether the physician's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"reliance on those declarations was reasonable.6

This court's

majority opinion did not attempt to undertake such an analysis
of this type of testimony.

Rather this court relied solely

upon Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and allowed the
witness to make that determination of reliability himself.

As

the dissent in the instant case points out, this court's majority
opinion serves as an expansive loophole for the use of highly
unreliable evidence. Other courts have eliminated this loophole
by engaging in the analysis described above.
Again, the dissenting opinion in this case does find
that the evidence

in question

was merely

cumulative.

That

issue was addressed in Point III A of Appellant's Reply Brief.7
As was described in that brief, Dr.
any other evidence presented

Moench went well beyond

at trial regarding

appellant's

character and Marc Shchreuder's background.
This court misapplied

the law on the issue of the

admissibility of declarations made to a physician for preparation
for testimony at trial.

The court's decision on this issue

should be re-heard and appellant's conviction should be reversed
and a new trial ordered.

6. This analysis was undertaken on Point III C of Appellant's
Brief which is attached as "Appendix C".
?•

See Appendix D.
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POINT IV
THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS RELATING
TO THE ELEMENT OF INTENT IN THE OFFENSE OF
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.
This court misapprehended the facts relating to the
issue of appellant's intent.

In ruling that the evidence was

sufficient to sustain the conviction for Murder in the First
Degree, this

court

stated

that the evidence

indicated that

appellant believed that she would receive an inheritance if her
father died.

The only evidence introduced with respect to the

will indicated that appellant's mother would inherit or control
the entire estate.
appellant's belief

(R. 808)
as

to

uncorroborated testimony

The only evidence regarding the

her

of

an

father's

intentions

accomplice.

was

the

(Tr. 725, 732)

This element and evidence was the only difference between first
and second degree murder.

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 338 (Ut.

1977).
Such evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict.
This court should reconsider its finding on this issue.

The

appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded
to the District Court with an order to reduce the degree of
offense from first to second degree murder.
CONCLUSION
This court misapprehended the facts and the law relating to the appeal in this case. The issues raised above should
be reheard and reconsidered.

The appellant's conviction should

be reversed and this court should order either a new trial or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the entry of a judgment of acquittal.
Dated this

day of September, 1986

RONALD J. YENGICH

G. FRED METOS

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on
this

day of September, 1986.
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A
THE TESTIMONY OF DR. MOENCH IMPROPERLY PLACED
INTO EVIDENCE THE CHARACTER OF THE APPELLANT
AND THUS DENIED HER DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Dr. Moench's opinion, which was based substantially
on hearsay, was simply a device for improperly placing character
evidence before the jury. The statements clearly put appellant's
character into issue, without her first raising the issue by
introducing character

evidence.10

Rule

404, Utah

Rules of

Evidence, (1983), provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence
of a person's character or a trait of his
character is not admissible for the purpose
of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of his character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same; [Emphasis supplied] H
~
10. In fact character or reputation evidence as to appellant was
never offered at trial. See Gramham, West's Handbook of Federal
Evidence, (1981) §404.3 at 198:
In criminal cases, Rule 404(a)(1)
provides that the prosecution may not in
the first instance introduce evidence of a
pertinent character trait of the accused as
part of the case in chief against him. By
longstanding tradition the unfair prejudice
to the defendant in being portrayed as a
"bad man" is felt to substantially outweigh
any probative value the evidence might possess.
11. This rule is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 404
and conforms to former Utah Rule of Evidence 47(b) which provided
in pertinent part:
[I]n a criminal action evidence of a trait
of an accused's character as tending to
prove his guilt or innocence of the offense
charged . . ., (ii) if offered by the
prosecution to prove his guilt, may be
admitted
after
has
introduced
Digitized by theonly
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Hunter Lawthe
Library,accused
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Dr. Moench testified as to the conversations he had
with Marc Schreuder. This testimony, in effect, served to prove
that appellant had a bad character in that she was an overbearing,
cruel and dominating mother, and controlled her son Marc through
various devices which included threatening suicide and locking
Marc and his brother out of their home.

Dr. Moench was allowed

to go so far as to voice an opinion about an Oedipus complex
between son and mother, and that Marc showed no signs of independent thinking.

In addition, Dr. Moench made reference to

hearing a tape of Mrs. Schreuder and her daughter, Lavinia.12
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the
prosecution may not introduce evidence of an accused's character
unless the accused himself raises the issue."
609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980).

See also Boyce, "Character Evidence;

The Substantive Use," Utah Bar Journal
21-22.

There,

Professor

State v. Urias,

Boyce

(Summer-Fall

states,

"Until

the

1976) at
accused

offers evidence of his own good character, the prosecution may
not offer evidence of an accused's bad character."
Three cases from this court have demonstrated this
court's intent to limit evidence presented at trial to that
which avoids general allegations of prior misconduct tending
to show that the accused is such an evil person that he or she
likely is guilty of the offense charged.

In State v. Dickson,

361 P.2d 412 (Utah 1961), State v. Kazda, 382 P.2d 407 (Utah
1963) and

State v. Peterson, 457 P.2d

532 (Utah 1969), this

12. This tape was ruled inadmissible by the trial court at the
sentencing hearing.
(Tr. 935)
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court reversed convictions where wide ranging cross-examination
by prosecutors produced evidence of other unproven wrongdoings
from the accused on the witness stand,13

The evidence of prior

misconduct introduced through Dr. Moench's opinion is the type
that concerned the court in Dickson:
The very purpose of excluding such evidence
is to prevent the prosecution from smearing
an accused by showing a bad reputation and
relying on that for conviction rather than
being required to produce adequate proof of
the crime in question. . .
. . . It is the sound and salutary policy
of the law to indulge everyonef including
convicted felons, with the presumption of
innocence, and to require the state to
obtain and present sufficient credible
evidence to convince the jury of the
defendant's guilt of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. (361 P.2d at
414)
0rf as worded differently, but nonetheless effectively:
. . . The universally accepted general rule
is that such evidence is not admissible if
its effect is merely to disgrace the
defendant or show his propensity to commit
crime. (361 P.2d at 415)
Here, the

defense

appellant's good character.

never

offered

any

evidence

of

Therefore, it was erroneous and

prejudicial to the point of denying appellant her due process of

<

13. In Kazda, the defendant was charged with assault with
intent to commit murder.
An F.B.I, agent testified about
his questioning the accused about other unproven crimes including murder. In Dickson, the accused charged with robbery was
questioned concerning an unrelated incident in Texas where both
he and his brother received gunshot wounds. In Peterson, the
defendant was charged with distribution of L.S.D. The court
found a prosecutor's questions about his use of other narcotics
improper andDigitized
reversible
by the Howard W.error.
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

*

law for Dr. Moench's testimony to be admitted.14

Thus, the

conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.15

14, Fourteenth Amendment, Constitution of the United States;
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of the State of Utah.
15. This court has similarly held that when the character of the
accused is put into question by the defense the prosecution
may, on rebuttal, offer evidence from third persons, but, that
testimony must be limited to reputation or opinion and may not
relate to specific instances. State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137,
148 P. 1971 (1915).
In Anselmo, the court states at p. 1616,
"It is settled law that evidence of good
character, or evidence to the contrary,
must be confined to general reputation of
the person, or the general reputation of
the particular trait in issue".
In the case at bar, Dr. Moench testified that appellant allegedly
committed various specific acts against Marc Schreuder which
were not a result of the defendant previously offering evidence
of good character^
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B
BECAUSE ANY PROBATIVE VALUE IN DR. MOENCH'S
TESTIMONY WAS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY
THE INSURMOUNTABLE PREJUDICE, ITS EXCLUSION
WAS REQUIRED BY RULE 403 , UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
The recently adopted Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence provides that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.16
The case law holds that the determination of relevance
is a two step test in which the trial judge must first determine

16. This rule is substantially the same as former Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule
Digitized 45.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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whether the evidence is relevant to some issue at trial other
than that the defendant is a bad person, and second, whether
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of undue prejudice.

"Only when both of these tests have been

affirmatively satisfied

is

the

evidence properly

United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d

188, 191

admitted."

(2d Cir. 1978)

cert, den. 439 U.S. 868, 58 L.Ed.2d 179, 99 S.Ct. 196 (1978).
If the trial judge "has carefully made the requisite
analysis, the exercise of his broad discretion will not be
lightly overturned."

See State v. John, 615 P.2d 1263, 1264

(Utah 1980), United States v. Williams, supra, at 577 F.2d 191.
However, where, as here, the trial judge has passed over this
analysis in arriving at his decision, his discretion has been
abused, or

never

exercised

at

Alvarez, supra, at 584 F.2d 701.

all.

Cf., United States v.

Had the trial court balanced

this evidence as required by the rules, he would have concluded
that the evidence was highly inflammatory, both inherently, and
in the

context

of

this

case.

See State v. John, supra at

1264.
Evidence of prior wrong doing is inherently prejudicial
in that it tends to persuade the jury that the defendant is a
bad person, and
crimes.

that he or she has a propensity to commit

Such prejudices

are acutely dangerous because they

distort the determination of guilt or innocence, and because
jurors are particularly responsive to their influence.

Author-

ities agree that this type of evidence is usually dispositive
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of the underlying

issue

in most

cases.!7

In this context.

Judge Weinstein, in his treatise on evidence, speaks unequivocally:
If the trial judge concludes that the
reliability of the inculpatory statement is
outweighed by the possibility of prejudice—
which he will almost always do—he should
exclude it. Because of the dangers involved,
exclusion should almost always result when
a statement against penal interest is
offered against the accused. (Citation
omitted, emphasis in original.) 4 WEINSTEIN,
On Evidence 804-113.
The prejudice to appellant in the context of this case
is obvious.

As the trial court stated at one point in the the

proceedings (Tr. 75-76):
THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Jones:
Actually, the factual matter as to what the
police reports have as to the shooting of Mr.
Bradshaw are not a big issue. What I am
saying, there are no — it's not the major
part of the case. I would imagine one day
you are going to get all of that part of
case in.
MR. JONES: Hopefully, yes.
THE COURT: Well, you know, there is nobody
going to dispute the fundamental basis in
view of the one conviction. Nobody is going
to make a big issue over cause, I would
presume, or hope nobody is going to require
any extensive medical testimony whatsoever
concerning the cause of death and this, that
and the other. Those matters, they are not
the issues, really, and I am sure you can do
those in a day.
MR. JONES:

the

That's correct.

17. Controlled studies of jury behavior and decision-making have
confirmed that admission of evidence of other crimes may double
the chances of conviction where there are contradictions in the
government's case. See, e.g. H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The
American Jury
160
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THE COURT: The issues become on these other
matters of — and I use just in a broad
phrase, so-called direction or duress. Those
are the big issues, aren't they?
MR. JONES: They are.
THE COURT: And the gentleman whose problems
just thinking out loud. These matters in New
York, as I say, that portion of the item, of
the issue, seems to hinge substantially upon
the credibility issue. Where does the truth
lie as to why?
MR. JONES: Well, I have no question
THE COURT: Not how, but why.
fairly well state the issue?
MR. JONES:

—

Does that

I think it does, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't think anybody is going to
raise a lot of fuss about how.
MR. JONES:

But I guess my position

—

THE COURT: That's the reason I am concerned
about the question I had and it's in my mind,
I will speak out loud, the necessity of the
information in the State of New York is what
gives me the problem.
Although the Court, in this exchange with the prosecutor, did show some concern over the issue of other bad acts, it
nevertheless allowed

the evidence to come

previously argued, the probative value
minimal while at the same
devastating.

of

in at trial.

As

the evidence

was

time, the prejudicial effect was

Therefore, it was prejudicial error to admit the

evidence and appellant's conviction should be reversed and a
new trial ordered.
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MARC SCHREUDER'S STATEMENTS TO DR. MOENCH
CONSTITUTED INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY AND SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED.
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Although both the present and former Rules of Evidence
allow statements made to a physician for purposes of diagnosis
or treatment

to be admissible

as exceptions

to the hearsay

rule,I8 courts have required a strong showing of reliability
before admitting statements made solely to obtain an expert's
opinion for litigation.

United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d

77 (8th Cir. 1980)r dealt with a similar issue in the context
of a child witness who was alleged to be the victim of a sexual
assault.

The court allowed the doctor who treated the child to

testify about her statements regarding the assault.

The court

noted that there was a strong indicia of reliability in that
the girl's description

was made

for the purpose of medical

treatment and it was given shortly after the incident occurred.
The court also specifically stated that had the statement been
given to an expert

solely

for the purpose of obtaining an

expert's opinion for trial then it may not have been admissible.
It then enunciated a two tier analysis to be used in determining
the admissibility of such statements.

Firstr the trial court

must determine if the declarant's motive for making the statement is consistent with the rule.

Secondly, the trial court

must decide if it was reasonable for a physician to rely on the
information in performing

his

diagnosis

or treatment.

In the instant case, Dr. Moench was originally called
upon to provide a diagnosis of Marc Schreuder's mental state as

18. See Utah Rules of Evidence 803(4) and the former Utah
Rules of Evidence
63(12).
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evidence in defense of his own case.

(Tr. 927)

Marc's defense

was that he was under extreme mental and emotional pressure
from appellant, who convinced him to commit the homicide.
848)

(Tr.

Appellant submits that Marc's motive to falsify in such a

situation was substantial.

Not only was there a strong possi-

bility that he was attempting to avoid a criminal conviction by
shifting the blame to his mother, but it is also probable that
he was attempting to save his own life, in that he was charged
with a captial offense.

Consequently, the evidence here fails

to pass the first tier of the Iron Shell test.

The hearsay

statements also fail the second tier of analysis, the reasonableness of the physician's reliance on the evidence.

Here,

the only meetings Dr. Moench had with Marc consisted of two two hour interviews.

(Tr. 927)

ously never been revealed.
substantiate the
close friends.

The statements made had previ-

Nor was there any attempt made to

statements

through

any

other

relatives

or

Finally, the statements were made several years

after the homicide.

Consequently, the statements made by Marc

were inadmissible hearsay.
In addition, appellant's trial counsel was not able
to effectively

cross

examine

Marc

on

the

statements,

thus

denying appellant her right to confrontation as guaranteed by
the Sixth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments

to

the

United

States

Constitution and Article I, Section IV of the Constitution of
the State of Utah.

Although Marc had been called to testify at

trial, he was not cross-examined about these statements.
reason for that

The

is obvious, the trial court had previously
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ruled that Marc's statements to Dr. Moench were inadmissible.
(Tr. 45)

Marc was called to testify prior to Dr. Moench, thus

precluding cross-examination on these statements.
The situation here is analogous to those cases where
a witness is called and refuses to answer, thus allowing the
prosecution to introduce a prior statement by that witness into
evidence.

In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) and State

v. Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1975) the United States Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of Utah both respectively held that
such a situation denies a criminal defendant his constitutional
right to confrontation.

In both of these situations the witness

is able to avoid a face to face confrontation with the defendant
and the jury so that his demeanor and credibility
weighed.

are not

Douglas v. Alabamay supra.
When an appellant's right to confrontation has been

denied, unless it can be demonstrated that the error was harmless
beyond a

reasonable

doubt,

a

conviction

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

must

be

reversed.

The extreme pre-

judicial nature of this evidence has previously been discussed
and need not be repeated.

Suffice it to say that the number

and nature of the wbad acts" described by Dr. Moench could not
possibly have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant
respectfully submits that the conviction rendered below must be
reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for a new
trial.
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POINT III
A
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY ALLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF CHARACTER
EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT.
At trial, the court allowed Dr. Louis Moench to describe the relationship between Marc Schreuder and appellant as
it had been related to him by Marc Schreuder.

One of the

effects of this testimony was to allow evidence of bad character,
in violation of Rule 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Respondent argues that there was no specific objection on the
basis of character evidence made to this testimony.

Secondly,

respondent argues that such evidence was merely cumulative.
Respondent relies on Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence in claiming there must be a statement of the specific
grounds for objection to claim error on appeal.

However, under

that rule, it is sufficient if the grounds for the objection were
apparent from the context in which they were made.
case an

testimony

about

In this

objection

was made

to

appellant's

threat of suicide.

(R. 1947)

From this context, it is obvious

that in addition to the hearsay guestion, this objection was
made to evidence of character or bad acts of appellant. Likewise, more general objections were made regarding the content
of the statements related to Dr. Moench by Marc Schreuder.

(R.

1946, 1951)
Respondent also argues that appellant's rights were not
substantially affected by Dr. Moench's testimony because it was
merely cumulative.

The majority of Dr. Moench's testimony is
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set out

in appellant's brief.

In essence, Moench describes

a situation where Marc Schreuder and his brother, Larry, were
continually being locked out of appellant's apartment, requiring
them to sleep in stairwells.

She would not allow him to have

friends, would threaten to disown him, would threaten to move
to Harlem, or live in the gutter.

Dr. Moench also described

how appellant had been seeing a psychiatrist and how, when he
moved, Marc Schreuder took the psychiatrist's place in counseling appellant.

(R. 1947-1951)

When Marc Schreuder testified he did not mention the
majority of the

information described

to Dr. Moench.

With

respect to being locked out of the home he described one incident
that he remembered when he was 13 or 14 years old.

(R. 1823)

He also described one incident where his mother struck him.
Further, he stated that she put pressure on him and "harped" at
him all of the time.
described by Dr.

(R. 1823)

None of the other incidents

Moench were related in court by Marc Schreuder.

Other evidence

cited

by

respondent

as making

Dr.

Moench's testimony cummulative included Richard Behrens1 statements:

"appellant would get upset but it would blow over",

(R. 1987), she got angry and went into a rage when he demanded
money from her (R. 2009), finally, he was aware that appellant
had locked Marc Schreuder out on occasion but he did not know
of any incident where Marc was locked out for a week at a time.
(R. 2109)

Vittorio Gentile testified that he would have to

strike or beat appellant on occasion, and that was to bring her
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out of

hysterical

convulsions*

(R. 1850)

Marilyn

Reaganf

appellant's sister, stated there would be times that appellant
would become hysterical and loose control.
was answered

This

in conjunction with questions about appellant's

marital problems
Gentile*

(R. 2407)

resulting

from

physical

abuse

by Vittorio

With these witnesses, including Marc Schreuderf the

statements regarding appellant's character arose from isolated
questions with each witness. Never was a long involved discussion of appellant's character described

by Dr. Moench.

The

effect on the jury from those witnesses could not have near the
impact that Dr. Moench's testimony had.
As for the testimony of Steven Kleinf that was given
over objection

by

defense

counsel.

(R. 2437,

2440)

That

evidence did not relate to appellant's relationship with Marc
Schreuder.

Similar to the testimony just described, the effect

of Klein's

testimony

was

insignificant

in

relation

to Dr.

Moench's.
In conclusion, the nature of the evidence from witnesses other than Dr. Moench relating to appellant's character
was not cumulative.

Essentially, the other witnesses described

appellant's temper. They did not describe the specific incidents
as related by Dr. Moench. Nor was the majority of the testimony
given by

these

witnesses

focused

Consequently, the error committed

on

appellant's

character.

at trial in admitting the

testimony of Dr. Moench regarding the character of appellant
was prejudicial, requiring reversal of the judgment and conviction.
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